Learning to deploy civilian capabilities: How the United Nations, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and European Union have changed their crisis management institutions by Dijkstra, Hylke et al.
  
 
Learning to deploy civilian capabilities: How the
United Nations, Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe and European Union have
changed their crisis management institutions
Citation for published version (APA):
Dijkstra, H., Petrov, P., & Mahr, E. (2019). Learning to deploy civilian capabilities: How the United Nations,
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and European Union have changed their crisis
management institutions. Cooperation and Conflict, 54(4), 524–543.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836718823814
Document status and date:
Published: 01/12/2019
DOI:
10.1177/0010836718823814
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
CC BY-NC
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836718823814
Cooperation and Conflict
 1 –20
© The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines: 
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0010836718823814
journals.sagepub.com/home/cac
Learning to deploy civilian 
capabilities: How the United 
Nations, Organization for 
Security and Co-operation  
in Europe and European  
Union have changed their  
crisis management institutions
Hylke Dijkstra , Petar Petrov  
and Ewa Mahr 
Abstract
International organizations continuously deploy civilian capabilities as part of their 
peacekeeping and crisis management operations. This presents them with significant 
challenges. Not only are civilian deployments rapidly increasing in quantity, but civilian 
missions are also very diverse in nature. This article analyses how international organizations 
have learned to deploy their civilian capabilities to deal with a growing number and fast 
evolving types of operations. Whereas the previous literature has addressed this question 
for individual international organizations, this article uniquely compares developments in 
the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), three of the largest civilian actors. Drawing on the concept of 
organizational learning, it shows that all three organizations have made significant changes 
over the last decade in their civilian capabilities. The extent of these changes, however, varies 
across these organizations. The article highlights that the EU, despite its more homogeneous 
and wealthier membership, has not been able to better learn to deploy its civilian capabilities 
than the UN or OSCE. We show that the ability of these organizations to learn is, instead, 
highly dependent on institutional factors.
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Introduction
International organizations increasingly deploy civilian capabilities as part of their 
peacekeeping and crisis management operations. While there were, for example, only 44 
civilian police officers involved in United Nations (UN) missions in 1990, their number 
averaged over 10,000 in 2018 (United Nations, 1990, 2018). Regional organizations also 
deploy significant civilian capabilities. The European Union (EU), for instance, deployed 
more than 1600 civilian experts to Kosovo in 2008 as part of its Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2009, 
Appendix 3A). This policy now includes 10 ongoing civilian missions. The Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) similarly has a wide range of civilian 
missions, including a large-scale monitoring mission in Ukraine consisting of over 850 
international staff (OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 2018).
Because deploying civilian capabilities is a relatively new activity for international 
organizations and their member states, it poses significant challenges. For instance, 
while soldiers are recruited for expeditionary missions, the career path of an average 
police agent or judge does not include a stint abroad (Korski and Gowan, 2009: 44). 
Furthermore, civilian officials are normally deployed on the basis of their individual 
expertise, which requires thorough selection procedures. It is not always clear what type 
of equipment civilians require to do their job. Finally, the mandates of civilian missions 
vary widely, from riot control to monitoring peace agreements.
This article asks how international organizations have learned to deploy their civilian 
capabilities to deal with a growing number and fast evolving types of operations. It draws 
on the concept of organizational learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Levitt and March, 
1988; Levy, 1994), which can be defined as institutional change resulting from new infor-
mation, observation and experience with the objective of increasing performance (cf. 
Smith, 2017). The article compares changes in the UN, OSCE and the EU, three of the 
largest civilian actors, since the late 2000s.1 It shows that these organizations have made 
significant changes. Yet, surprisingly, despite its more homogeneous and wealthier mem-
bership, the EU has not been able to deploy its civilian capabilities more easily than the UN 
or OSCE. We argue, therefore, that it is critical to consider the institutional context – par-
ticularly the number of veto points and the involvement of member states in everyday 
management – to understand how learning takes place. The less-institutionalized context in 
the UN and OSCE has provided staff with more opportunities to learn.
This is not the first article on learning in international organizations. Yet, both the 
comparative focus and the empirical study of civilian capabilities make it unique. Much 
of the existing literature tends to address this research question for individual interna-
tional organizations engaged in military tasks (e.g. Benner et al., 2011; Faleg, 2017; 
Hardt, 2018; Junk et al., 2017; Smith, 2017). The advantage of a comparative approach 
is that it provides a benchmark (Smith, 2017: 40) to measure the extent to which inter-
national organizations have changed their civilian capabilities. We thus explicitly focus 
on external validity in this article – how international organizations in the area of crisis 
management fare in comparison to others. The contribution of this article, however, 
goes further. Through the comparative approach, we show the theoretical significance 
of the institutional context.
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The article starts with a review of the literature on organizational learning. We notice 
that, despite a considerable degree of theoretical sophistication and empirical testing, the 
emphasis has remained on individual international organizations. By extending the analy-
sis to the UN, OSCE and EU, this article contributes to an emerging comparative literature 
on international organizations (Dijkstra, 2016; Eckhard and Ege, 2016; Hardt, 2014; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2015; Knill and Bauer, 2016). The article subsequently analyses, for 
each organization, how they have made changes with respect to the financing, staff and 
equipment of civilian missions. The article concludes with a comparison of the findings.
Changing international organizations based on experience
Organizational learning has been a focal concept in several disciplines (Aldrich, 1999; 
Argyris, 1982; Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2011; Sabatier, 1988). Yet, with the exception of 
Ernst B Haas (1990; Haas and Haas, 1995), students of international organizations have 
largely ignored learning perspectives. Recent studies have, however, gradually addressed 
this gap. Various scholars have focused on UN peacekeeping (Benner et al., 2011; 
Hirschmann, 2012; Howard, 2008; Junk et al., 2017), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) (Hardt, 2018), global environmental governance (Siebenhüner, 2008) and the EU 
(Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008; Zito and Schout, 2009). Noteworthy is research on learning in the 
area of EU security policy (Adebahr, 2009; Bossong, 2013; Faleg, 2017; Smith, 2017).
Organizational learning is a difficult concept to define (Adebahr, 2009: 85; Benner 
et al., 2011: 53; Levy, 1994: 280). It is thus important that we clarify what we mean with 
the concept of learning and how we identify it empirically. Despite definitional discus-
sions, we witness a convergence around common elements in the most recent studies on 
organizational learning. Adebahr (2009: 97) defines organizational learning as the rewrit-
ing of rules as a result of reflection. For Benner et al. (2011: 55, 56), organizational learning 
is similarly a knowledge-based process of questioning the existing organizational rules 
with the aim of changing them and ultimately changing the organizational practice. Finally, 
Smith defines experiential institutional learning as ‘changes in institutions’ functions, pro-
cedures and capabilities as a result of new information, observation, or experience’ (2017: 
40). For this article, we take inspiration from Smith’s succinct definition to link (1) new 
information, observation and particularly experience to (2) institutional change with the 
objective of improving performance (see Illustration 1). This explicit linkage is where 
learning differs from alternative explanations of change, such as the changing political 
preferences of states, competition and survival, organizational routines, new ideologies and 
major historical events (e.g. Barnett and Coleman, 2005; Feldman, 2000; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984; Jupille et al., 2013; Mahoney and Thelen, 2009; Nielson and Tierney, 
2003). While the institutional changes may not have the desired effect, the objective of 
organizational learning is to ultimately improve performance.
A key question is how to measure institutional change resulting from experience. 
Scholars provide us with ambitious standards by seeking to understand how learning 
affects ideas, beliefs and norms. Thus, Levy (1994: 286) distinguishes between ‘simple’ 
learning that is expressed by delineating what works and where changes need to be made, 
and ‘complex learning’, which appears once a full set of stable beliefs, attitudes and norms 
develops. Similarly, Bossong (2013: 97) adopts the terminology of ‘single-loop learning’ 
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– understood as a simple adjustment of organizational processes to improve task perfor-
mance – and ‘double-loop learning’ – denoting a ‘deeper’ engagement with organizational 
objectives or values. This article has a more modest goal: to trace the nature of institutional 
change in three international organizations in civilian crisis management. As such we use a 
broad concept, including simple learning and processes of trial-and-error.
To operationalize our concept of learning we follow Smith (2017), who observes that 
changes across specific institutional dimensions can be seen as an indicator for learning. We 
focus, in this respect, on changes in the resources and rules related to deploying civilian capa-
bilities.2 Changes in the resources are about the accumulation of finance, personnel and 
equipment in support of civilian deployments. For instance, if member states decide to col-
lectively fund a warehouse for equipment or a training centre for staff, this would count as 
changes in resources. Changes in rules are understood as modifications of existing institu-
tional structures, procedures and routines, or the creation of entirely new ones, with respect to 
the deployment of resources. For instance, if procurement procedures are made more flexible 
this is an example of changes to the rules regarding finance. Similarly, if as a result of chang-
ing doctrines, resources are used in a different way, this also is evidence of changing rules.
Establishing the link between (1) new information, observation or experience and (2) 
institutional change presents another challenge. Benner et al. (2013: Table 27.1) provide a 
useful list of possible intervening variables that help us explain why certain international 
organizations may be better at learning than others. Their list includes formal design, 
resources for knowledge management, reporting procedures, incentive systems, culture, 
leadership, political pressure and bureaucratic politics. They subsequently group these 
variables by distinguishing between (a) institutional factors and (b) political factors that 
may facilitate or obstruct learning in international organizations (Benner et al. 2013: Table 
27.2).3 These factors help us to understand how information, observation or experiences 
from previous planning, deployment and mission implementation processes ‘travels’ to 
relevant officials in international organizations (both secretariats and member states), 
whether such officials propose change and whether such change is adopted and institution-
Illustration 1. Learning in international organizations.
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alized. In other words, there are many potential institutional and political obstacles prevent-
ing international organizations from learning.
Our three empirical cases of organizational learning in the UN, OSCE and EU provide 
significant variation across these institutional and political factors. While all three are 
formal international governmental organizations (e.g. Vabulas and Snidal, 2013), the EU 
is considered more institutionalized than the UN and OSCE (see Table 1). The EU is 
known for the significant degree of centralization in Brussels and oversight by its member 
states in terms of the day-to-day management of civilian crisis management (e.g. Eckhard 
and Dijkstra, 2017; Mattelaer, 2013). In other words, the EU has a high number of insti-
tutional veto points, which are ‘all stages in the decision-making process on which agree-
ment is legally required’ for change (Haverland, 2000: 85; Immergut, 1990; Tsebelis, 
1995).  This also creates an institutional practice in which the member states are actively 
involved and where proposed technical changes rapidly become politicized. In contrast, in 
the UN and OSCE the veto points are more limited and concern mission mandates and 
budgets rather than day-to-day management (Dijkstra et al., 2016; Karlsrud, 2013; 
Mattelaer, 2013). In the UN, for instance, the Security Council takes great care in negoti-
ating the mandating resolution, but once the mission gets implemented, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the ground takes the lead with sup-
port from the UN Secretariat (Dijkstra et al., 2016; Karlsrud, 2013). The role of member 
states is subsequently limited to the budget and mandate renewal. The situation in the 
OSCE is similar, but the headquarters plays an even smaller role. The OSCE is largely 
decentralized with the large majority of staff located in missions.
At the same time, these organizations also have very different types of membership. 
Whereas the UN and OSCE have a heterogeneous membership, including the USA and 
Russia, the EU has a relatively homogeneous one. The extent to which the membership is 
politically divided is potentially significant, since this not only undermines the consensus 
on experiences (Faleg, 2017), but also lowers the chance that the membership can agree on 
change. In other words, by empirically comparing these three organizations, we can better 
understand the importance of the intervening variables in the organizational learning 
process.
Improving civilian capabilities: lessons learned in the UN, 
OSCE and EU
This article has discussed conceptually how international organizations learn. In what 
follows, it analyses how experience, observation and new information have resulted in 
institutional change in the UN, OSCE and EU. By providing a comparative perspective, 
we can make a better judgement about the significance of learning in individual cases. 
Table 1. Variation in institutional context and membership in the UN, OSCE and EU.
Institutionalization Membership
UN Medium Universal and heterogeneous
OSCE Low Regional and heterogeneous
EU High Regional and homogeneous
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We find that while learning has taken place in all three organizations, these organizations 
have attached priorities to different aspects of civilian capabilities. We show that the EU 
has not been able to learn to deploy civilian capabilities more significantly than the UN 
or OSCE. This is surprising considering the EU’s more homogeneous and wealthier 
membership. We argue, therefore, that it is critical to consider the institutional factors to 
understand how learning takes place.
While the UN, OSCE and EU deploy civilian missions, it is not straightforward to 
compare them. For instance, UN peacekeeping missions often have civilian and military 
components, while the EU makes a distinction between civilian and military missions.4 
Furthermore, while the EU Special Representatives are not part of the EU missions, 
similar roles in the UN and OSCE are often precisely labelled as (political) missions. For 
our article, we take a narrow definition, because analysing all civilian actions would not 
allow us to go sufficiently in depth. Because the civilian deployments of the UN, OSCE 
and EU are not entirely similar, and because the institutional context differs, we discuss 
them one-by-one. For each organization we focus on how experience, observation and 
new information result in changes to the resources and the rules governing those 
resources.
UN: Coping with numbers
While the UN sent police officers to Congo as part of its peacekeeping operation as early 
as 1960, civilian deployments were limited during the Cold War (Bellamy and Williams, 
2010: 377–396; Hansen, 2002). Currently it has 10,000+ civilian police officers 
deployed (United Nations, 2018). The UN gained serious experience with the establish-
ment of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the UN Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia in 1992. In 1995, the UN established its 
police-only mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The next step came with the 
transitional administration missions in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. Civilian compo-
nents in peacekeeping operations further developed during the 2000s and almost all new 
operations now include civilian deployments.
The UN has also established a wide range of political and peacebuilding missions. For 
instance, the Secretary-General has a mandate for the pacific settlement of disputes 
(Article 99 of the UN Charter), which has resulted in the appointment of numerous spe-
cial envoys (Mani, 2007: 309–310). The UN has also long placed emphasis on conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding (United Nations Secretary-General, 1992), which has trig-
gered the deployment of peacebuilding missions (Paris, 2007: 406–410). Finally, in sev-
eral countries there is no need for blue helmets, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, with the 
UN concentrating on civilian tasks (Paris, 2007: 410–411).  For the UN, we focus par-
ticularly on changes in the context of the Global Field Support Strategy (2010–2015), 
based on the experience of the increasing civilian deployments. We do not address head-
quarters reforms under Secretary-General António Guterres in 2018-2019.
When it comes to the deployment of civilian capabilities, it is useful to distinguish 
between finance, staff and equipment and mission support. The Global Field Support 
Strategy, for instance, addressed these issues (United Nations Department of Field Support, 
2015; United Nations Secretary-General, 2010). This reform process was informed by the 
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surge in deployments during the 2000s following the landmark Brahimi report (United 
Nations, 2000) and the establishment of the Department of Field Support (DFS) in 2007. 
Its overall intention was ‘to transform service delivery to field missions. It [was] designed 
as an integrated comprehensive programme that [drew] on the lessons learned from several 
decades of operational experience’ (United Nations Secretary-General, 2010: 3, emphasis 
added). It focused on rapid deployment, the recruitment of staff and addressing vacancy 
levels and optimizing procedures, including in the global and regional services centres 
(United Nations Secretary-General, 2010). Because the Global Field Support Strategy was 
a learning exercise par excellence, it is important to consider how it affected civilian 
capabilities.
To start with funding, significant is that political missions fall under the biennial gen-
eral UN budget, whereas peacekeeping missions each have their own separate budgets. 
Member states thus pay for political missions on the basis of their gross national income 
(GNI) and population size. Political missions take about a fifth of the total UN budget of 
US$3 billion per year (United Nations Secretariat, 2014).  This includes all regular UN 
staff, the headquarters and operational expenditure. Finance is a source of tension 
between the Security Council, which authorizes political missions, and the General 
Assembly, which authorizes the budget.5 An important lesson is that the budgetary cycle 
creates deployment problems, as ‘mission start-up, expansion or transition’ require con-
siderable ‘flexibility’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2011: paragraph 4). Member 
states approve peacekeeping budgets (US$6.7 billion over 2018–2019, United Nations 
General Assembly, 2018), on the other hand, on an annual basis. There is frustration that 
peacekeeping is still being treated as an extra-budgetary activity, despite the fact that it 
is bigger than the regular budget (United Nations, 2015b: 15). Even though funding is 
extraordinary, temporary and thus insecure, these arrangements provide flexibility: the 
UN has been able to increase its peacekeeping resources in light of the increasing deploy-
ment demands. It has not been able to change the rules about the organization of the 
political and peacekeeping budgets due to opposition from the membership (Dijkstra, 
2012; United Nations, 2000: xiii, 2015b: 33). We have thus witnessed changes in the 
resources, but not the rules, on the basis of previous experience. Furthermore, the insti-
tutional context (the way in which funding is organized in the UN) has been a critical 
determining factor for the increase in peacekeeping resources.
When it comes to personnel, there is an important difference between deployed uni-
formed personnel (soldiers and police) by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and 
contracted civilian personnel by missions themselves (Coleman, 2014: 8–12). The UN 
compensates TCCs with a flat-rate reimbursement of US$1428 for each deployed person 
per month. Civilian contracted international and local personnel are paid for by the mis-
sions themselves and are therefore considerably more expensive. We furthermore need 
to distinguish between Formed Police Units (FPUs), individual officers/experts and 
standing capacities. FPUs are self-sustained units of about 140 deployed police (United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 
2010: paragraphs 20–21). They are a relatively recent phenomenon, but there has been a 
rapid increase in their use (Durch and Ker, 2013: Table 1 and Figure 2). In 2016, there 
were 71 authorized FPUs in UN missions with 8723 police officers as opposed to 3362 
individual police officers (United Nations, 2016, n.d.). Their key functions are public 
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order management, the protection of personnel and facilities and high-visibility patrols 
(United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field 
Support, 2010: paragraphs 12–15). Because they are self-sustained, the force generation 
process is easier than with individual police. The increase in FPUs (civilian resources) is 
mainly the result of the observation that more police were needed, vacancy rates for 
individual police were high and that mandates increasingly require robustness (Durch 
and Ker, 2013). 
For the selection of individual staff, the UN Secretariat draws up the job profiles, 
which are circulated to the member states (Durch and Ker, 2013: 13–14). While the UN 
has long struggled with a high vacancy rate, which the EU and OSCE also experience, it 
has made a strong effort to reduce it (from 20% to 15%) as part of its Global Field 
Support Strategy (Durch and Ker, 2013: 15–16, Table 2, Figures 3a and 3b; United 
Nations Secretary-General, 2014: paragraph 12(e); United Nations Department of Field 
Support, 2015: 3). This is an achievement, given that at the same time total deployments 
have also increased. It does not imply, however, that the problem is solved. Several mis-
sions still have considerable vacancy rates and it is also a question of the quality of per-
sonnel or the required niche capacities.
Because the UN experienced a struggle to get staff in theatre rapidly, it established a 
Standing Police Capacity (SPC) in 2006 (see Weinlich, 2014). With a capacity of almost 
40 officers, this capability is modest, but it proved helpful during the start-up phase of 
new missions. The SPC can also provide assistance to existing peacekeeping missions 
(Durch and Ker, 2013: 7–8). It is based at the UN Global Service Centre (UNGSC) in 
Brindisi, Italy. In 2010, the SPC was complemented by a modest Justice and Correction 
Standing Capacity (JCSC) of five persons (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, 2014: 48–50). These are niche capacities that help the UN to more rapidly 
Table 2. Changes to the resources and rules of civilian capacities in the UN, OSCE and EU.
Finance Staff Equipment and mission 
support
UN Significantly more resources 
for peacekeeping missions; 
resistance to change the 
financial rules.
More resources through 
FPUs, a reduction in 
vacancies and the standing 
capacities.
More resources for 
the UNGSC and the 
establishment of the 
RSCE.
OSCE Extra-budgetary resources 
create flexibility and some 
flexibility in rules in case of 
rapid deployment.
Development of roster to 
allow for rapid deployment 
of resources.
Development of virtual 
pool of resources 
to allow for rapid 
deployment of resources.
EU More resources for missions 
as well as emergency 
measures; more flexibility 
in using procurement rules.
No improvement in staff 
resources with respect to 
niche and administrative 
expertise and training.
Increase in resources 
through the Mission 
Support Platform and 
the warehouse.
FPU: Formed Police Unit; UNGSC: UN Global Service Centre; RSCE: Regional Service Centre in Entebbe.
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launch missions and an example of learning: changes to the resources for rapid response 
were made based on previous experience.
The UN has set up an elaborate mission support structure. Aside from New York, the 
UNGSC plays a central role. It is the logistical base for all UN entities. It includes a 
warehouse with direct access to Brindisi airport. The UNGSC also provides expert 
teams for the start-up phase of missions. In addition, the UN established the Regional 
Service Centre in Entebbe (RSCE), Uganda, in 2010. Since many UN missions are 
deployed in insecure regions, the rationale is to pool all non-essential administrative 
tasks in a more secure location. The RSCE, for example, does payroll, information and 
communications technology (ICT) and training for the peacekeeping operations in East 
and Central Africa. The establishment of the RSCE and the reform of the UNGSC are 
key deliverables of the Global Field Support Strategy and are directly based on previous 
learning experience.
When looking back at institutional developments regarding civilian capabilities, we 
can identify change with the objective to improve performance. The UN system has used 
previous mission experience, particularly in the Global Field Support Strategy, to opti-
mize resources for civilian deployments. The pressure to learn and improve performance 
has come simultaneously from the extraordinary deployment numbers and the member-
ship being cautious of spending additional money on these increased deployments. The 
UN has at times struggled to keep up with the demands (e.g. for a detailed analysis, 
United Nations, 2015b). It is furthermore striking that despite significant increases in 
resources and improvements in day-to-day management, the membership has been reluc-
tant to change many of the rules governing the deployment of capabilities (see Table 2). 
For instance, the high-level report of 2015 (United Nations, 2015b) repeated many of the 
lessons concerning the stringent institutional rules already identified in the Brahimi 
report (United Nations, 2000). It is also not a surprise that, under the pressure of the 
growing deployment numbers and in light of an assertive Trump administration, the new 
Secretary-General is actively reorganizing peacekeeping and field support.
OSCE: Learning by stealth
OSCE missions were initially a reaction to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 
and the wars in former Yugoslavia. In 1992, the OSCE launched ‘missions of long dura-
tion’ to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina as well as the Spillover Monitor Mission to 
Skopje (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1992: Annex 1).6 In addi-
tion, it deployed missions to Estonia, Latvia, Moldova and Georgia to help with the 
political transition, and minority and human rights. Following the wars in former 
Yugoslavia, the OSCE became active in peacebuilding. The Kosovo Verification Mission, 
which was withdrawn in March 1999 due to the NATO airstrikes, was the largest mission 
with 1500 staff (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, n.d.). The deploy-
ment of the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine in 2014 has resulted in a 
revival of OSCE missions. It consists of 850+ international staff (OSCE Special 
Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 2018). For the OSCE, we study the main changes since 
the late 2000s and particularly with the deployment of the SMM in 2014.
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To understand how the OSCE has changed based on this experience, it is important to 
start again with the budget. The Unified Budget is negotiated on an annual basis on the 
basis of consensus by the 57 participating states. In 2018, the Unified Budget was €137 
million, which included Secretariat expenditure and field operations (Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2018). Individual mission budgets range from 
€17.4 million for Kosovo to €1.7 million for the Centre in Ashgabat. The SMM is excep-
tionally not included in the Unified Budget, because its budget is €85 million. 
Furthermore, it was created as an urgent response to the escalating crisis. The SMM 
shows that despite the general rigidity of the OSCE budget, with a consensus rules, there 
is flexibility in terms of resources when required. In this respect, the OSCE is a less-
institutionalized organization.
Exceptionally, every single post is mentioned in the Unified Budget (Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2018: Annex II). The Secretariat is rela-
tively small, with 346 positions apart from so-called augmentations. Most staff mem-
bers (around 2000 posts), largely secondments and local staff, are serving in field 
missions. For secondments, the OSCE pay only the Board and Lodging Allowance 
(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2016). Internationally con-
tracted staff members, in the Secretariat and the missions, are limited to a 7-year term 
of employment and there is a general time limitation of maximum 10-year terms of 
employment for the OSCE. The OSCE has some flexibility in finding ways to respond 
to unforeseen circumstances. This is accomplished by either achieving savings within 
existing operations, or by utilizing previously established contingency funds. For 
instance, in the absence of both an approved mission budget and an agreed crisis 
response facility for the SMM, the OSCE used a contingency fund previously set 
aside for financing responses to unforeseen circumstances, augmented by cash sav-
ings from previous years. This helped finance the initial set up and daily running of 
the mission for the first month (Neukirch, 2014b). Missions can also be funded 
through ‘extra-budgetary projects’: missions staff can devise a project and do their 
own fundraising in Vienna. Such flexible funding regimes we do not see, for instance, 
in the more institutionalized EU. Without downplaying the great difficulty of getting 
sufficient financial resources, amidst the 57 heterogeneous participating states, such 
flexibility is noteworthy.
In terms of personnel, the OSCE developed, prior to the launch of the SSM in 2014, 
based on previous mission experience, an internal roster for rapid deployment. This ros-
ter provides information on available staff and their core competencies. The concept is 
based on two steps. Firstly, staff from the Secretariat and other field missions are desig-
nated as ‘first responders’ to form the core of a new mission. Secondly, this initial nucleus 
is replaced under the standard procedures (Neukirch, 2014a). The SSM showed how the 
system works in practice. The roster was opened to all staff members who were willing 
to be temporarily deployed. Four days after the decision to establish the mission, 31 first 
responders from the Secretariat and nine from existing missions were deployed in Kiev. 
Five days later, the first monitors recruited via the regular secondment system arrived as 
well. Within a month all first responder monitors were replaced by regular seconded staff 
(Neukirch, 2014b). For an organization under severe budgetary constraints, with a split 
membership, this was a considerable achievement. It is an example of how key staff 
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members mostly in the Secretariat, based on previous experience, are trying to increase 
OSCE performance through institutional change.
We see a similar development in terms of equipment. The OSCE has developed a 
‘virtual pool’. This removes the need to store large amounts of physical equipment and 
yet enables a timely and reliable access to essential material resources – from armoured 
vehicles to computers – when required. When the OSCE develops a mission it normally 
asks for in-kind contributions from the host authorities, but otherwise does its own pro-
curement. For the countries where the OSCE deploys it has ‘window contracts’ with 
certain companies. As such, the OSCE does not need to go through a vetting process and 
can purchase equipment without delay. In the case of the SMM, the Secretariat made all 
necessary arrangements within days so that when the personnel arrived in the field, they 
already had access to everything required (Neukirch, 2014a, 2014b). This is yet again an 
example of pragmatic steps taken by OSCE staff in terms of civilian capabilities.
In conclusion, the OSCE presents a different model of organizational learning from 
the UN. Despite the stringent budgetary procedures, the general lack of funding and the 
need for consensus among its varied membership, we have witnessed important steps 
towards professionalization of field support. The roster and the virtual pool of equipment 
are practical, and extra-budgetary funding allows the OSCE to pursue specific projects. 
These changes to the resources and the rules were made prior to the deployment of the 
large-scale SSM, and therefore in the absence of real functional pressures or major cri-
ses. This can only be explained due to the specific institutional context, which apart from 
the budget is less institutionalized than the UN and EU, and is small-scale in character 
(see also Eckhard and Dijkstra, 2017). This has allowed senior staff at headquarters to 
pursue practical reforms with only a limited amount of obstruction from the membership. 
This difference with the UN in terms of learning processes cannot be explained by refer-
ring to the (equally) heterogeneous membership.
EU: Flexibility in the rules
The EU established its first civilian crisis management mission in 2003. The EU Police 
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina took over the responsibility for police training and 
reform from the UN. Since 2003, the EU has established a wide range of civilian mis-
sions. Some of the most significant include police training in Afghanistan (2007–2016), 
monitoring in Georgia (2008–present) and the rule of law mission in Kosovo (2008–pre-
sent) (see Howorth, 2014, for an overview). Civilian missions are kept mostly separate 
from military operations. For the EU, we focus on the changes since the late 2000s on the 
basis of the experience from Afghanistan, Georgia, Kosovo and more recent missions.
Funding is a critical resource for EU missions and it displays the difficulty of translating 
experience into institutional change. Civilian missions fall under the EU budget. While the 
member states continue to pay the salaries of seconded personnel, per diems are paid for by 
the EU. The EU also pays for contracted staff, equipment, mission infrastructure and secu-
rity. The 7-year Multiannual Financial Framework sets the key parameters of the annual 
budgets. This budgeting procedure is inherently problematic, as it is impossible to predict 
crises over such a long period (cf. UN political missions). Budgets for civilian CSDP are 
also difficult to amend when a crisis hits, as the European Parliament sets budgetary 
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ceilings. During the first years of the CSDP, funds were always in short supply precisely 
because missions had not been anticipated. In 2005, for example, the budget for all mis-
sions was €59 million, which could not cover the unexpected mission in Aceh (Dijkstra, 
2013; European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2013: 268). While the budget went up 
to €251 million in 2008, this proved insufficient for the new missions in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Georgia. Currently, however, the total amount of funding (€235–280 mil-
lion, European Commission 2015: III/905) is generally considered sufficient.7
Problems remain with crises that suddenly arise, for example in Ukraine. The launch of 
the EU mission there was, for example, ‘possible only because of the transfer of funds from 
other budget headings’ (High Representative, 2015: 9). In response to such experiences, the 
EU has developed mechanisms for flexibility. Most importantly, the EU now has a budget 
heading for ‘emergency measures’ of tens of millions of euros. Another concern has been 
the difficulty to spend money prior to the formal decision to deploy. Based on negative 
experiences, two improvements have been made. Firstly, the EU established so-called ‘pre-
paratory measures’ (European Parliament and Council of Ministers, 2012). Secondly, since 
2013, the EU now adopts two Council Decisions during the planning process: the first to 
release funding and appoint key staff; the second to approve the mission (Tardy, 2015: 
25–26). Learning processes have therefore resulted both in significantly increased resources 
for the civilian CSDP and increased flexibility in the rules.
Procurement is an area where traditionally many problems occur. Firstly, EU procure-
ment rules are not tailor-made to the local situation in conflict countries. Following cor-
ruption scandals in the 1990s, the EU now has very strict rules and the European 
Commission applies them strictly, keen to avoid future scandals. Secondly, they are com-
plex and require specialized administrative expertise. The EU has made significant 
changes in terms of procurement rules following negative experiences, such as in 
Afghanistan. These include framework contracts and the establishment of a warehouse 
and provisions in crisis situations. Framework contracts are established prior to a mission 
and allow the EU to select preferred suppliers. To further speed up procurement, mis-
sions can order supplies through the new warehouse, currently run by a private partner in 
Sweden, which replenishes stocks through the framework contracts and makes sure that 
equipment is available prior to the deployment (European Commission, 2018). Therefore, 
missions no longer have to go through the procurement process themselves. Another 
method to create flexibility is to apply the exceptions for ‘crisis situations’, which allows 
for procurement without a call for tenders (European Commission, 2012: article 190(1)
(a)). The increased flexibility in procurement rules is a direct result of previous lessons.
In terms of personnel, the EU established a Civilian Headline Goal in 2004 and a 
Civilian Capability Development Plan in 2012 (updated in 2018), both with the aim of 
clarifying the required number of staff as well as their profiles. Member states have, 
however, been reluctant to a priori commit personnel to EU missions. As such, these 
efforts have largely failed and most EU personnel are recruited on an individual basis 
when the missions have vacancies. This is a major administrative process. In 2014, for 
example, there were 1269 vacancies, for which 807 candidates were eventually selected.8 
While only two out of three vacancies were filled, there are large discrepancies between 
missions and across profiles. New missions tend to be popular. Recruiting staff gets more 
difficult once the mission has been running for a while. Furthermore, missions have 
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different profiles. A monitoring mission is about having a presence on the ground, while 
capacity-building missions require specialized expertise. For example, it has proved dif-
ficult to recruit judges for Kosovo. While these shortfalls are well-known, member states 
have barely made changes to the available human resources for EU missions. They have 
not sufficiently increased the number of individual candidates they sent on mission, nor 
have they developed civilian teams (cf. the increase in FPU units in the UN).
Following recruitment, mission staff take part in pre-deployment training. The member 
states have the responsibility for organizing pre-deployment training for seconded staff 
(CIVCOM, 2009: paragraph 9). The quality of training varies (CIVCOM, 2011: para-
graphs 7–18). For contracted staff, there is often no pre-deployment training. In response, 
several initiatives have been developed. Most ambitious was the ENTRi project, run by a 
pan-European consortium of training institutes, until 2016. An advantage was that it fully 
funded participants, allowing contracted staff to take part.9 The European Security and 
Defence College (ESDC) started to offer pre-deployment training in 2015.10 The chal-
lenge is mostly financial due to the fact that the member states have to cover travel and 
accommodation. As such, pre-deployment training remains uneven and contracted staff 
go to missions often untrained (European External Action Service, 2015: 7–8). This is yet 
another case of problems formally identified, but not addressed as a result of a lack of 
willingness by the member states to provide the resources or change the rules.
With a view to the more challenging missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the EU 
established the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in Brussels in 2007 to 
provide civilian missions with permanent operational command (Bossong, 2013: 104; 
Dijkstra, 2013: 70). Due to the specific financial rules, however, many administrative 
functions have been decentralized by delegating them to the missions. This includes sup-
port functions such as human resource management (HRM), finance, logistics and ICT. 
Decentralization has two related problems. Firstly, as missions are temporary, qualified 
staff members leave when the mission ends. Secondly, as missions are deployed in diffi-
cult environments, administrative staff may not be interested in long-term deployments. 
The net result is that it is challenging to recruit well-trained administrative staff and to 
retain their expertise long-term. The EU looked into the possibility of a Shared Services 
Centre as early as 2010 (Council of Ministers, 2010). A European Parliament motion 
noted that a Shared Services Centre ‘would guarantee greater efficiency both by pooling 
administrative functions, starting with the selection and recruitment of personnel, and by 
centralising procurement and equipment management’ (European Parliament, 2011: para-
graph 21(c)). The negotiations have, however, been difficult and the ambitions have been 
watered down: in April 2016, the Council agreed to establish the Mission Support Platform 
with a total of around eight staff members (down from the original 30).11 The number of 
staff has increased modestly since. Most recently, a Core Responsiveness Capability was 
added in 2018 (on the model of the OSCE roster), which strengthens the Mission Support 
Platform. This final example highlights how protracted some of the learning processes are 
in the EU, despite the relatively homogeneous and wealthy membership.
Learning in the EU differs from that in the UN and OSCE. The EU has put in place 
procedures for learning with annual reports discussing experiences and proposing new 
measures to optimize performance. In fact, it produces a tremendous number of docu-
ments, including Council conclusions and reports for the Political and Security Committee 
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and the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Yet, because of the 
institutionalized nature of the EU, which importantly goes beyond the immediate domain 
of the CSDP, nearly everything needs to be discussed with the member states in commit-
tees. Even practical solutions, such as a Shared Services Centre, prove difficult. Member 
states have hardly been forthcoming with additional resources, even if the efficiency gains 
are apparent. Furthermore, staff and budgetary rules often get in the way. EU officials 
therefore have tried to ensure maximum flexibility within the existing rules. This is par-
ticularly clear in the financial domain, where budgetary officials have relaxed the EU 
rules. Furthermore, some new resources have been made available, such as the emergency 
measures and the warehouse. The striking conclusion remains that the EU is not doing 
better than the UN and OSCE, despite its homogeneous and wealthy membership.
Conclusion
This article has analysed how the UN, OSCE and EU learned to deploy their civilian 
capabilities to deal with a growing number and fast evolving types of operations. It has 
focused on changes in institutional characteristics within each of the three organizations 
to point out if learning is taking place. In particular, it has examined how experience, 
observation and new information have resulted in changes to the resources (finance, 
personnel and equipment) and the rules governing those resources. In providing an anal-
ysis across the UN, OSCE and EU, we have shown that these international organizations 
have very different institutional features and different types of membership, which both 
facilitate and provide obstacles for learning.
The empirical results, summarized in Table 2, provide us with a number of surprising 
insights. It is clear that all three organizations have made significant changes in how they 
deploy civilian capabilities. The processes of change have differed – from the compre-
hensive Global Field Support Strategy in the UN, to practical solutions in the OSCE and 
incremental and institutional change in the EU – but all three organizations have focused 
on changes based on previous experience. In addition, it is also clear that it has been 
easier to change and increase the resources for the civilian missions than the rules gov-
erning the use of resources. The member states of the UN, OSCE and EU have indeed 
substantially increased the financial resources for civilian missions. They have also made 
efforts regarding staff resources, equipment and mission support. There has been less 
change in the financial, personnel and procurement rules. Despite some flexibility with 
respect to funding, there has been little actual reform.
Our comparative research design has also resulted in surprising variation across the 
organizations. As our findings in Table 2 show, the EU has not done better than the UN and 
OSCE. It lags behind in terms of meaningful staff reform as well as mission support. It has 
a relatively high vacancy rate, does not provide all staff with pre-deployment training and 
has struggled to establish a modest Mission Support Platform. This cannot be explained by 
pointing out political factors, such as the composition of the membership. The EU has a 
more homogeneous and wealthier membership than the UN and OSCE. Instead it is impor-
tant to consider variation across the institutional factors. Due to the highly institutionalized 
nature of the EU, proposals for change need to be discussed by the member states in their 
specialized committees. This creates many veto points and obstacles even for pragmatic 
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solutions. Getting consent is not only a formal requirement; the EU also has an institutional 
practice in which everything gets checked with the member states.
The importance of institutional context becomes further apparent in the UN and 
OSCE. The drive to improve performance in the UN can be explained by the high 
demand for missions since the publication of the Brahimi report in 2000, which has been 
accompanied by a push for optimizing the use of the available resources. These pressures 
have focused attention on mission support and have allowed for a considerable profes-
sionalization. In the OSCE, the analysis uncovered the importance of lower degrees of 
institutionalization, stringent budgetary procedures and the need for consensus among 
the diverse membership. These factors pushed the OSCE staff to suggest several prag-
matic reforms as well. The large-scale SMM in Ukraine has furthermore focused atten-
tion in the OSCE. Despite political heterogeneity, the UN and OSCE have thus managed 
to adopt a less-politicalized and more pragmatic approach to civilian missions.
The findings of this article merit further research into how the institutional context con-
straints and facilitates learning in international organizations. Through the explicit com-
parative context on international organizations, it complements the institutional findings of 
Benner et al. (2011), who show how the UN has established dedicated learning units within 
the Secretariat, and Hardt (2018), who analyses the importance of informal sharing pro-
cesses in NATO. This article strengthens, in this regard, the case for further research on the 
institutional context. Furthermore, this article has focused on institutional change resulting 
from new information, experience and observation, but it has not analysed whether learn-
ing processes eventually result in better performance. In line with the expanding literature 
on the performance of international organizations (Gutner and Thompson, 2010; Lall, 
2017; Tallberg et al., 2016; Young, 2001), future research could focus on the role of learn-
ing when it comes to actual performance.    
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Notes
 1. Other international organizations, including the African Union and Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), also deploy civilian capabilities. The scale of UN, OSCE 
and EU deployment, however, justifies this selection. This choice limits the possibilities for 
generalization.
 2. Smith’s (2017) third indicator concerns the changes in responsibilities. This includes changes 
in the ‘specific types of foreign/security policy actions’ (p. 41) that international organizations 
pursue. We exclude this indicator, as it is in fact the starting point for our research question: 
all three international organizations have developed significantly in terms of responsibilities.
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 3. Political factors also affect how international organizations develop their institutions and 
establish learning practices. These are, however, more long-term developments, whereas we 
are interest in organizational learning on the basis of immediate experience.
 4. The EU has also launched a limited number of civil–military missions.
 5. A representative from Brazil, for example, calls political missions one of the ‘most important 
distortions’ in the regular budget (United Nations, 2015a).
 6. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe at the time.
 7. Interview #2, Brussels, February 2016.
 8. Interview #3, Brussels, March 2016.
 9. Interview #4, via phone, April 2016.
10. Interview #5, Brussels, April 2016.
11. Interviews #6 and #8, Brussels, April 2016.
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